

REPORT

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All times given in this report is local time (UTC + 1 hours), if not otherwise stated.

Aircraft

-type & reg.: Beech B55, N-7148R

-year of man.: 1977

-engines: 2 Continental IO-470L.

Date and time: 10 December 1998 at 1804 hrs

Location: Lista, RWY 14 (ENLI). Type of occurrence: Accident, hard landing

Type of flight: Private

Weather cond.: Wind: 160° 16 kt, strong wind in upper layer. Clouds at 900

ft clear below. Temp: 1° C. QNH: 1020 hPa

Light cond.: Dark

Flight cond.: VMC/IMC
Flight plan None.
No. of persons onb.: 1

Injuries: None

Aircraft damage: Extensive. Broken nose landing gear (NLG), damaged

propellers, airframe.

Other damage None

Commander

-sex/age: Male, 51 years

-licence: PPL-A

-fl. experience: Total of 1 026 hours, 515 hours on type (25 hours last 30

days), 68 hours in darkness (4,6 hours last 30 days)

Information sources: Pilot's report, contact with pilot, ATC

SUMMARY

The flight started at Stavanger Airport Sola (ENZV) bound for Lista Airport (ENLI). The pilot is a UK citizen. He is used to flying in Norway and he had been at Lista Airport on several previous occasions. Weather information was obtained approximately one hour before take off from Sola. Take off was performed at 17:20 for VFR flight in uncontrolled airspace. The amount of fuel could keep him airborne for 5,5 hours flying. He had planned flying at 1 000 ft, but due to the weather conditions he redecided and changed to 3 800 ft. Light icing at 3 800 ft made him descend back to 1 000 ft. On his flight southwards he met strong wind and asked for updated weather information for the Lista area. Based on the updated weather information he decided not to return to Sola, but continue to Lista. He

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board has compiled this report for the sole purpose of improving flight safety. The object of any investigation is to identify faults or discrepancies which may endanger flight safety, whether or not these are causal factors in the accident, and to make safety recommendations. It is not the Board's task to apportion blame or liability. Use of this report for any other purpose than for flight safety should be avoided.

requested vectoring to the ILS before he was cleared to land on runway 14 at Lista. He got visual contact in due time to perform a visual landing. The wind at that time in 500 ft was strong and gusting, estimated to be far stronger than the 16 kt on the ground. The landing speed was approx. 85 kt. (OK considering the wind). The landing gear were lowered and positively locked. This was also indicated in the cockpit. The pilot thinks he misjudged the height above the runway during the flair. The landing was thereby performed on the nose landing gear (NLG) and the propellers hit the ground. The aircraft porpoised several times before the NLG leg broke at the third contact and the aircraft started to skid on its forward belly. It came to a rest on the runway with major damages to the airframe, the landing gear and propellers. The scenario is confirmed by contact marks on the runway. The pilot did not judge the wind to be problematic before the aircraft hit the runway on the NLG and the propellers hit the ground. Lista airport is not equipped with centreline lights. Because the pilot was alone in the cockpit and had a fairly large workload he did not consider requesting dimming of runway lights. He feels it would have been easier to judge a correct height if the lights had been dimmed. Runway 14 is not equipped with PAPI or equivalent visual landing aids. If such aid had been installed, establishing a correct glidepath would have been easier. In addition he would have appreciated centreline lights. In afterthought, he should have made a go around.

There were major damage on airframe and propellers.

COMMENTS FROM THE ACCIDENT BOARD

Based on information from the pilot, technical problems are not a contributing factor to the accident. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board (HSL) concurs to the pilot's assumptions that he misjudged the height above the RWY and that this misjudgement in combination with a wind-gust caused the nose wheel landing. The runway lights will not be automatically dimmed unless requested by a pilot. This is in accordance with the regulations (AIP 1.1-3) Since the pilot did not request dimming, the lights were not dimmed. HSL agrees that undimmed runway lights will complicate the pilot's possibilities of judging a correct height and distance.