

## BULLETIN

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Telefax: + 47 64 84 57 70 Date: 29. July 1999

Aircraft

-type & reg.: Ilyushin Il-76TD, RA 76478
-engines: Four Soloviev D-30KP-1
Radio call sign: Aeroflot (AFL) 9901
Date and time: 4. April 1998, 0617 hrs

Location: Approach to runway 18 at Harstad/Narvik airport Evenes

(ENEV), Norway

Type of occurrence: Serious incident, error in navigation

Type of flight: Commercial freight

Weather cond.: Wind: Variable 5 kt. Visibility: 9 km. Clouds: Few at 1 500

ft, broken at 2 500 ft. Snowshowers in the area. Temperature

and dewpoint: Both 0 degrees C. QNH: 1 008 hPa

Light cond.: Daylight Flight cond.: IMC Flight plan: IFR

No. of persons onb. : Unknown Injuries: None Aircraft damage: Nil

Commander

-sex: Male
-age: Unknown
-licence: Unknown
-fl. experience: Unknown

Information sources: Report from air traffic controller (radar), a short report from

the aircraft commander and the AAIB/N's proper investigations. It must be noted that the AAIB/N immediately after the occurrence made several attempts to contact the Russian authorities in order to secure a read out of the aircraft's flight recorder, in which the AAIB/N did not succeed. This bulletin may therefore give an incomplete picture of the incident. On March 22 1999, the AAIB/N received a short report on the incident from the Federal Aviation Authority of Russia.

Details from this report is included in the bulletin

All times given in this report is local time (UTC + 2 hours), if not otherwise stated.

## **SUMMARY**

Aeroflot (AFL) 9901 was on an IFR flight plan from Moscow to Evenes. The aircraft, an Il-76TD, entered Norwegian territory from Sundsvall control area in Sweden. During the approach to runway 18, at 0617 hrs, the weather was partly cloudy with snow showers in the area. The crew reported stabilized on the localizer. The air traffic controller in the tower observed, on his radar screen, that the aircraft was located approx. 4 NM east of the extended centerline. The aircraft altitude was between 4,500 and 4,000 ft.

4,000 ft is the initial approach altitude (safe altitude in this sector is 5,800 ft). The air traffic controller instructed the crew to climb back to 6,000 ft. Thereafter he started radar vectoring for an approach to the ILS runway 18. The controller has, based on his memory, made a sketch of the approach patterns. The sketch was made on the request of the AAIB/N, after the occurrence. A copy of this sketch is enclosed. (See Appendix no.1.)

AFL 9901 was vectored over on the west side of the localizer. From that position the crew was given an intercept angel to establish on the localizer. When the aircraft also this time went through the localizer and ended up on the east side, the air traffic controller started a new vectoring. This time he requested the crew to make an approach to runway 18 based on the VOR. Finally this approach was accomplished without problems, and the aircraft landed safely at 0639 hrs.

The ILS was checked the day before by the flight inspection aircraft from the Civil Aviation Authority, without remarks. Following AFL 9901 problems to establish on the ILS localizer, the ILS was checked again by a technician. Nothing abnormal was noticed.

A scheduled aircraft (SAS 2303) landed shortly after Aeroflot on a monitored ILS approach to the same runway, without remarks.

The report from the Federal Aviation Authority of Russia states:

"The incident was caused by the infringement of flight rules of the crew. Awaiting the vectoring from the dispatcher they had not put aeronautical data in the airborne computer and had not tuned in the frequency VOR 113.1 MHz. They had used only ILS system and NDB actuator."

(See Appendix no. 2.)

## COMMENTS FROM THE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD

The duty officer of the AAIB/N did not succeed to get in touch with the appropriate Russian authorities to initiate a read out and analysis of the aircraft recorders. As this flight had certain similarities with the approach made to Svalbard airport Longyear, Spitsbergen on 29 August 1996, which had catastrophic consequences, it would be of great interest to the AAIB/N to confirm that there is no disparity between the Russian approach procedures and the use of Norwegian approach installations.

The AAIB/N considers it a sound routine for an airline crew to utilize all available navigation equipment during an approach, even at airports where radar guidance may be expected.

This incident confirms the utilitarian value of the newly installed radar station at Evenes airport.

## Appendices:

- 1: Air traffic controllers sketch
- 2: Evenes ILS 18