Report on marine accident Finnøyglimt - LNIM foundered at Sletta north of Haugesund 7 October 2011

The AIBN’s investigation concludes that Finnøyglimt probably took in water through leaking hatches. The cargo hatches were not secured, and forward trim resulted in a particularly large amount of green sea on deck. The water ingress probable caused shifting of the sand cargo in the aft part of the hold. When Finnøyglimt passed Tømmerflua at around 23:00, the vessel may have had a list of 3.5°. The list and forward trim increased as the vessel took in more and more water. Finally, the vessel lost buoyancy and sank east of Ramnsholmene.

In the AIBN’s opinion, Finnøyglimt was designed with the cargo hold too far forward. In homogenous load condition, the vessel would therefore be trimmed forward. The investigation also uncovered that it was not established practice to secure the cargo hatch covers before departure. In the AIBN’s opinion, the vessel’s minimal crew may also have affected the preparations made prior to the voyage and resulted in the hatch covers not being secured.

After the accident, the AIBN commissioned SINTEF to analyse the properties of the sand and the aggregate. One important conclusion in the SINTEF report was that the addition of moisture would ‘liquefy’ the sand, i.e. a layer would form in which friction between the sand particles was reduced. This means that, if the moisture content of the sand were to reach 11.5% and the vessel was rolling, the sand could shift even though it had been levelled out. The shipper had not looked into this matter and had thus not the basis for informing the vessel’s crew about the risk of such a cargo shift, as required by regulations.

The AIBN proposes three safety recommendations in this report. The first safety recommendation is addressed to the shipper to look into the properties of the products being shipped from its facilities and otherwise comply with the provisions of the Norwegian Regulations concerning the carriage of cargoes on ships and barges (the Cargo Carriage Regulations) as amended from time to time as regards providing information to ships about the properties of the cargo. The second safety recommendation is addressed to the Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA) to take measures to determine the scope of the problem of shippers not informing ships about the properties of the cargo, and that it implement relevant measures to ensure that the provisions of the currently applicable Cargo Carriage Regulations are complied with. Thirdly, the Norwegian Maritime Authority is recommended to review its administrative practice relating to minimum safe manning by clarifying the term ‘daytime arrangement’.

The AIBN’s report also refers to earlier Recommendation MARINE No 2012/04T, in which the AIBN recommended that the NMA order cargo ships for which stability calculations have not been carried out using an approved program, to procure new and complete trim and stability documentation; to Recommendation MARINE No 2012/05T, in which the AIBN recommended that the NMA introduce provisions on maximum forward trim/ minimum bow height; to Recommendation MARINE No 2012/07T, in which the AIBN recommended that the NMA take measures to increase awareness in the industry of risks associated with inadequate securing of hatches, and Recommendation MARINE No 2010/24T, in which the AIBN recommended that the NMA specify the scope of safety management systems for cargo ships with a gross tonnage of less than 500.

Finnøyglimt. Photo: Tor Erlend Gjærde