Report on a head-on collision between a passenger car and a van on the E39 at Austefjorden, Volda, Møre og Romsdal on 20 October 2019

Vei rapport 2020/07 eng

On 20 October 2019, a van collided head-on with an estate car on the E39 road at Austefjord south of Volda. The accident occurred in a curve, speed limit 80 km/h, just south of the Damfoss tunnel. The people in the front seats of both vehicles sustained moderate injuries in the incident. In the rear seat of the estate car, two people died, and one was severely injured. The investigation has concentrated on luggage securing, and on the safety equipment in the estate car’s different seats, in particular the safety level for the middle rear seat passenger. The investigation has shown that use of seat belts, and the correct fitting of seat belts is important to reduce the extent of injuries in the event of accidents. The seat belt in the middle of the estate car’s rear seat had a different construction than all the other seat belts in the same vehicle, and the NSIA is concerned that the regulations do not sufficiently provide for rear-seat passenger safety, and that no collision tests have been established to test this.

On the morning of 20 October 2019, immediately south of the Damfoss tunnel in Volda, a van collided head-on with an estate car of approximately the same weight, fully laden with passengers.

Both vehicles are considered to have driven at a speed around the speed limit in the 80 km/h speed limit zone. 

The persons in the front seats of both vehicles sustained only minor injuries. The left rear seat passenger in the estate car was unsecured and died later from the injuries sustained in the collision. The middle rear seat passenger was secured by a seat belt and died instantly from extensive injuries. The right rear seat passenger was secured, but sustained critical abdominal injuries probably as a result of sliding under the seat belt during the collision.

It became clear after the accident that the van driver was driving without a driving licence, but had completed training. Driving without a licence is unacceptable from a road safety perspective. The road conditions in the bend where the accident occurred were demanding and difficult to identify at the time of the accident. In the NSIA’s opinion, the road conditions at the scene were so bad that any driver would have found them challenging.

The NSIA focused on the sequence of events and survival aspects of the accident, and why the injuries sustained by the rear seat passengers were so different and so much more severe than those suffered by the other passengers. The investigation concentrated therefor on the safety equipment in the estate car’s different seats, and focused in particular on the safety level for the middle rear seat passenger.

The seat belt in the middle of the estate car’s rear seat had a narrower lap belt than all the other seat belts in the same vehicle, and was also the only belt without a pretensioner and force limiter. The seat belt’s shoulder belt was attached to a folding rear seat-back, rather than to the vehicle body like the other belts. The investigation showed that the back of the rear seat was severely deformed, despite being reinforced and well within the regulatory strength requirements described in UN-ECE R17.

The investigation showed that the split rear seat-back in the estate car was subject to a loading from luggage weighing 65 kg in total. In addition to this came the loading imposed by the middle rear seat passenger’s seat belt. The compartment cover beam was not fitted, and could not be fastened to the rear seat-back in any case. 

It is the NSIA’s opinion that the luggage was sensibly packed. Heavy items were placed low against the seat-back, and the total weight was within what one might expect a rear seat-back to withstand, with or without the compartment cover beam fitted.

The NSIA’s investigation has caused it to be concerned that the regulations do not sufficiently provide for rear-seat passenger safety, and that no collision tests have been established for the middle rear passenger`s seat.

The investigation has shown the importance of securing the load in the boot, not just to prevent loose items from entering the passenger compartment, but also as means of preventing increased loading on the rear seat-back. This is an important passive safety measure for all persons in the passenger compartment, but especially for the middle passenger in rear seats with a split seat-back. 

The NSIA issues one safety recommendation based on this investigation.

Published: 17.12.2020

Sikkerhetstilråding

Sikkerhetstilråding VEI nr. 2020/10T

I frontkollisjonen i Volda 20. oktober 2019 omkom to personer som satt i baksetet i stasjonsvognen og en person ble hardt skadet, mens personene foran i begge bilene overlevde ulykken med kun lettere skader. Undersøkelsen av høyenergiulykken som oppstod i omkring 80 km/t har vist at sitteplassenes sikkerhetssystemer i stasjonsvognen var konstruert forskjellig. Sikkerheten i midten i baksetet var direkte knyttet til hvordan en delt bakseterygg klarer å motstå belastningen fra passasjer og bagasje plassert i bagasjerommet. I dette tilfellet bidro usikret men godt plassert bagasje til store deformasjoner på bakseteryggen. SHK har vurdert UN-ECE R17 (anneks 9) og testkrav til bakseterygger opp mot denne ulykken, og mener at testkravene ikke godt nok ivaretar sikkerheten til passasjerer i midten i baksetet.

Statens havarikommisjon tilrår Statens vegvesen å gjøre en vurdering med sikte på å forbedre regelverket for sikkerheten til baksetepassasjerer og informere The Working Party on Passive Safety (GRSP) i FN om denne ulykken og funnene i undersøkelsen.

Fakta

Sted E39, Volda, Møre og Romsdal
Hendelsesdato 20.10.2019
Ulykkestype Møteulykke
Veitype Europavei
Fylke Møre og Romsdal
Kjøretøy/trafikant Personbil
Type transport Persontransport, Privat transport
Veiregion Vestland
Ulykkeskategori Annen ulykke

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